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ABSTRACT 
The AIM-120A Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) is the premier 
air-to-air missile in the US arsenal. Although designed to counter threats that employ 
analog-based Electronic Attack (EA), the new threat of digital-based EA, Digital Radio 
Frequency Memory (DRFM), places a high priority on the capability to evaluate 
AMRAAM' s Electronic Protection (EP), which is defined as the capability to counter 
EA. AMRAAM effectiveness is not only dependent on its own capability to counter EA, 
but also on the ability of the fighter aircraft radar to counter the same EA while 
supporting the AMRAAM ( via data links) during the AMRAAM' s intercept profile. 
In the US Navy, the AMRAAM is carried by the F/A-18. EP testing of the two versions 
of F/A-18 radar has been limited due to funding constraints and other higher priority 
testing of the various capabilities associated with the air-to-air and air-to-ground Fl A-18 
mission requirements. In 1996, the US Navy funded the Weapon System Evaluation 
program, which includes EP testing of the F/A-18 and AMRAAM weapon system. 
Current test methods involve captive carriage of the AMRAAM against full-scale targets 
employing specific EA techniques. Radar data links to the missile are recorded in flight 
and replayed in the Hard-Ware In The Loop (HWIL) simulator to test missile 
performance during simulated missile intercept of the same EA threat. Twenty 
simulations are executed in the HWIL for each test flight to calculate missile probability 
of guidance (Po). For each HWIL simulation, 50 lethality simulations are executed to 
calculate probability of weapon effectiveness (PWE), Final products of the test program 
are a table illustrating Po and a bar chart illustrating PWE against several specific EA 
threats, including in both cases performance of the missile with perfect aircraft radar 
support to isolate missile performance. Neither the table nor the chart includes 
uncertainty associated with the calculated probabilities. 
A closer look at the test methods revealed that only a few tests of aircraft radar are used 
to characterize aircraft radar performance versus the EA threat while thousands of 
simulations are used to characterize AMRAAM performance. For the average number of 
test runs of each radar mode, the uncertainty associated with the aircraft radar 
performance calculation was found to be± 43.6% while the uncertainty associated with 
AMRAAM performance calculation was found to be± 1.39% (using 95% confidence 
interval). The combined uncertainty is± 44.4%, which spans a wide range of 
performance for any calculation of Po or PWE. The large uncertainty does not offer a 
solid foundation on which to base fighter tactics. Three methods of increasing the 
number of radar performance data were investigated for the purpose of decreasing the 
uncertainty associated with EP testing. First, synthetic data link file generation was 
determined to be ineffective because the data link error files were not stationary or 
ergotic, signal characteristics that are required for accurate generation of data link files. 
Second, time shift expansion, which involves generation of additional data link files 
(more radar performance data) from the recorded aircraft radar track files, was found to 
have some potential to reduce uncertainty. More evaluation would be necessary to 
quantify effectiveness. However, the effectiveness of time shift expansion would be 
limited at best because it does not add to the general characterization of aircraft radar 
performance against EA (no new radar performance runs, only more data from existing 
runs). Third, the NA VAIR Weapons Division China Lake F/A-18 radar laboratory was 
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researched as a method for generating more radar simulations against EA to more fully 
characterize radar performance. 
Utilization of the radar laboratory was determined to be by far the best technique for 
optimizing weapons system testing. The higher cost associated with more independent 
aircraft radar runs would reduce the number of test flights per year by one ( due to the 
fixed budget), but the dramatic reduction in uncertainty (from± 44.4% to± 20.5%) 
would be well worth the cost. Calculating PWE against four types of EA within 20.5% is 
much more valuable than calculating PWE for five types within 44.4%. 
The AMRAAM will remain in the US arsenal for many more years, and will face many 
new threats. The AMRAAM Integrated Project Team should pursue incorporation of the 
radar laboratory simulations into the EP testing process to significantly improve the 
accuracy associated with evaluation of weapon system performance. Additionally, 
NA VAIR should work towards long-term co-development of coupled systems such as the 
F/ A-18 radar and the AMRAAM to save money and to increase overall performance by 




This paper discusses various methods of evaluating the performance of one weapon 
system: the F/ A-18 and Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). 
Specific test results for this weapon system are classified. However, this paper discusses 
programmatic methods of testing at an unclassified level. Actual performance of the 
weapon system and specific threats against which the weapon system has been tested are 
intentionally not included. All sets of data in this paper have been altered through 
irreversible processes. Values of each set of data were uniquely normalized to a 
maximum of 1 or minimum of -1. However, characteristics of the processes have been 
preserved for analysis through relative signal comparison. 
Opinions expressed in this paper represent the perspectives of Lieutenant Cassidy 
Norman after serving as AMRAAM Project Officer for over two years. These opinions 
do not necessarily reflect the views of VX-30, the AMRAAM Integrated Project Team, 
Naval Test Wing Pacific, NA VAIR Weapons Division, the US Navy, or the US 
Department of Defense. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Air-to-air missile technology in the US Armed Services has become increasingly more 
complex and capable since the first AIM-9 Sidewinder was fielded in 1956. The 
Sidewinder successfully incorporated Infra-Red (IR) homing capability for missile 
guidance. Two decades later, the US military had two additional air-to-air missiles in its 
inventory representing two new technologies and a significantly increased engagement 
range: the AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-54 Phoenix. The Sparrow is a medium-range 
missile with semi-active radar guidance. The Phoenix is a long-range missile that 
incorporates active radar guidance. The latest air-to-air missile is the AIM-120 
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), an aerial intercept missile 
fielded just after the Operation Desert Storm that provides "autonomous launch and leave 
capability against single and multiple targets in all environments1 ." The AMRAAM, 
illustrated in figure 1, is an active radar guidance missile designed as "a follow-on to the 
AIM-7 Sparrow" that is "faster, smaller and lighter, and has improved capabilities against 
low-altitude targets2." 
Today the AMRAAM, carried by the F-15, F-16, and F/A-18, is the cornerstone of the 
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Two newer fighter aircraft not yet fielded, the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter, were 
designed to carry the AMRAAM as a primary air-to-air weapon. The internal weapons 
bays of these two aircraft were specifically sized to carry multiple AMRAAMs. 
Fighter aircraft that carry AMRAAM during combat operations use air-to-air radars to 
detect and identify airborne threats including aircraft and cruise missiles 1 • Once the pre­
determined rules of engagement have been satisfied and the fighter aircraft are within 
range, the AMRAAM can be fired at the target. When launched, the AMRAAM quickly 
accelerates to supersonic speeds and guides towards the target using proportional 
navigation based on target data transmitted from the fighter aircraft radar1 . In the 
terminal phase of the intercept, the AMRAAM activates its own radar system and tracks 
the target to intercept, allowing the fighter to maneuver as desired without having to 
maintain a radar track on the target 1 . 
Just as flares were developed in the 1960's to counter the threat of Sidewinders, 
Electronic Warfare (EW) has evolved to counter the threat of semi-active and active radar 
missiles. In addition to passive protection (such as chaff), defense against radar missiles 
now includes active Electronic Attack (EA), also referred to as 'jamming' or Electronic 
Counter Measures (ECM). "EA is the intentional radiation or re-radiation of Radio 
Frequency (RF) signals to interfere with the operation of a radar by saturating its receiver 
with false targets or false target information3 ." "Initial jamming responses included 
onboard self-protection pulse repeater, noise jamming, and missile-guidance-link 
jamming," all designed to attack radar guidance and missile endgame performance4. 
"The onboard jammin� degraded the missile-guidance and lock-on capability by creating 
angle and range errors . " 
Deceptive signals, even when as simple as noise jamming, can create a complex RF 
environment. Figure 2 is a simplistic diagram of AMRAAM employment against a 
jamming threat. Even before the AMRAAM is fired, the F/A-18 radar may meet the 
threshold of the jammer, which will stimulate EA designed to deceive not only the F/A-
18 radar, but also the radar of the AMRAAM. An EA threat can deny shot potential by 
destroying the quality of the F/A-18 radar track before the AMRAAM is fired. After an 
AMRAAM has been fired, an EA threat can cause the AMRAAM to miss by corrupting 
the F/A-18 radar track resulting in the F/A-18 sending bad data links to the AMRAAM or 
by denying/corrupting the AMRAAM' s track file during the terminal phase of missile 
flight. In any case, the AMRAAM is required to quickly and accurately process a dense 
array of signals to successfully prosecute the threat. 
AMRAAM missile software has become increasingly more sophisticated, including 
advanced capabilities to detect and ignore deceptive signals. "Older analog [EA] 
techniques, using set-on oscillators or frequency memory loops, suffer a significant loss 
of jamming effectiveness against modem coherent or spread spectrum radars due to the 
processing gain of the radar5 ." Even though several new and untested versions of analog 
EA techniques are still being discovered, the recent advent of digital recording 
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Figure 2: Illustration of AMRAAM Employment in EA Environment 
capabilities in EA threats has produced a much more capable EA technology. Instead of 
using a mechanical signal generator with limited signal alteration, the Digital Radio 
Frequency Memory (DRFM) technology allows the incoming radar signal to be digitally 
stored and then repeated with "no loss of effectiveness5 ." The preserved signal allows for 
"deceptive modulation of pulse replicas". that can be transmitted "at precisely optimum 
time for maximum ECM effect6 ." The capability of digitally storing an incoming radar 
signal with no degradation over time6 gives a jammer with DRFM technology the unique 
capability to simultaneously deceive in both range and velocity7 , enabling the "jamming 
energy to be concentrated far more effectively within the victim radar's  bandwidth5 ." 
Although no DRFM techniques have been recorded in air-to-air combat involving US 
forces8, many experts believe this significantly more capable EA technique represents the 
next generation of EA technology4•9• 10 • In the global market for military aircraft, recent 
sales have demonstrated a larger emphasis on EW. The recent purchase of US F-16s by 
the United Arab Emirates hinged on the inclusion of the most advanced EW package sold 
to date - a package even more advanced than EW packages found in US Air Force 
(USAF) F-16s. DRFM technology is included not only in the F-16 avionics suite, but in 
aircraft development in many countries worldwide. An additional reason DRFM is "an 
attractive way of implementing a false-target system" is that "DRFM is inherently 
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compatible with computer control so that systems with the short reaction times necessary 
for modern electronic warfare can be implemented 10." "While it once took 10-15 years to 
proliferate advanced technologies to the third world, co-production and co-procurement 
today give third world countries rapid access to technology improvements [such as 
DRFM{" Political decisions in the last decade have "not led to sustained investment 
needed to keep these [EW] systems on the cutting edge in the deadly game of measure 
and countermeasure 1 1  ." With the current funding shortfalls in acquisition programs all 
across the US Department of Defense, optimization of test programs is even more critical 
to maintaining the cutting edge of EW technology. Military aircraft, particularly those 
from the United States, Great Britain, and Israel, have consistently demonstrated in 
conflicts since World War II that maintaining the advantage in EW is a decisive 
advantage in combat. Understanding and improving air-to-air missile capability against 




HISTORY OF FLIGHT TESTING 
Since the introduction of RF guided air-to-air missiles, creating tactically representative 
test environments has been challenging. "The efforts of the Test and Evaluation (T &E) 
process are simulations of the projected weapon system performance in the tactical 
environment 1 2 ." T&E can be executed using computers, laboratories, and actual flight 
test, (including captive carry and actual live missile launches). The tactical environment 
is difficult to simulate for several reasons. The RF missile is a high performance vehicle 
that operates using advanced aerodynamic principles. Targets for other weapons such as 
guided bombs are relatively simple - stationary targets on· the ground often made from 
simple building materials. However, targets for air-to-air missiles must not only be fully 
functional flight vehicles capable of autonomous or remote control, but must also be 
representative of the defined threat. Ensuring targets are tactically representative is 
challenging. Additional simulation challenges include replication the highly dynamic 
intercept between two vehicles traveling towards each other at high-subsonic or 
supersonic airspeeds and the associated dynamics of RF signal transmission and 
reflection from the atmosphere, the Earth, and other airborne vehicles. 
Analog and digital computer simulations have grown in the last four decades to 
encompass a large part of air-to-air missile simulation. The low-cost and high-speed of 
computers make simulation an important part of most test programs. However, "the 
complexity of the radar, combined with the sophistication of modern ECM techniques, 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to gain this required level of understanding through 
analysis alone7." Experience has shown that computer simulation of air-to-air missiles 
should be used only after the software has been modified and validated to represent actual 
missile flight performance, and then only for limited application 1 3 .  
Hard-Ware In The Loop (HWIL) simulations, which can simulate an RF environment 
more accurately than all-digital simulation, can offer a valuable source of information for 
T &E. Several concepts associated with the missile can be tested with actual missile 
hardware to better understand or improve performance. Still, actual "launches of the RF 
guided missile provide proof of performance for the missile system. While representing a 
small number of the T&E tests, launches receive the lion's  share of attention as the 
program results are reviewed by the program office, the responsible service, the 
Department of Defense, and the Congress1 4 ." 
Sub-scale aerial targets can be used to meet the requirements of certain aspects of testing 
with air-to-air missile launches. Two sub-scale targets that have been used by the US 
Navy (USN) and USAF for the last three decades are the BQM-34 Firebee and the BQM-
74 Chukar. Sub-scale targets can be modified to include specific radar characteristics. 
However, in many ways, sub-scales do not accurately represent threat aircraft. Threat 
characteristics such as jet engine modulation, identify friend or foe response, and all­
aspect radar cross section cannot be simulated with sub-scale targets. Full-scale targets 
are still optimum for air-to-air RF missile testing. 
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Live fire testing of missiles is expensive not only because of the cost of the missiles, but 
also because of the costs of using a test range and the cost associated with a target 
presentation. All missile test programs would benefit from having a high number of 
missiles to test, but funding constraints have always restricted the number of missiles 
available. For several missiles currently in US inventory, the number of missiles 
available for testing before initial release is shown in table 1. In each case, a portion of 
these assets was used for live fire testing and another portion was permanently converted 
to test articles such as captive-carry pods and bench-top test hardware articles. Follow-on 
test programs are allocated even fewer assets. After initial release of the AIM-120A 
AMRAAM, three phases of improvement were scheduled to improve missile 
performance. The most current phase of AMRAAM testing, Phase III, includes only 
eight assets for air-launch testing. Although the complexity of these weapons has 
increased, proportional spending of defense funds for air-to-air missiles has decreased, 
most likely due to the relatively few air-to-air conflicts the US Armed services have 
encountered since the Vietnam War. 
Air-to-Air Missile Testing 
Due to the complexity of the threat environment created by EA, air-to-air missile testing 
against EW threats is the most difficult to simulate accurately. Even after one threat is 
accurately modeled or simulated, there are many different types of EA to counter. EA 
techniques always seem to be developed and fielded one step ahead of the air-to-air 
missile's ability to counter the technique 1 3 . 
Electronic Protection (EP) is a specific form of electronic counter counter measures, in 
which an air-to-air radar system is designed to defeat the intended effects of EA. 
Although the baseline AMRAAM was designed to include EP versus various jamming 
threats, and follow-on versions of AMRAAM software have concentrated on becoming 
increasing more resilient to EA, the effectiveness of AMRAAM also depends on the 
performance of the aircraft radar that is used to support the AMRAAM during its initial 
phase of flight. EA targets the radar in the aircraft (the APG-65 and APG-73 radars in 
the F/A-18) as well as the radar in the AMRAAM itself. 
Table 1 :  Missile Program Asset Allocations 
PROGRAM TOTAL TEST ASSETS
'" 
Sidewinder AIM-9L 65 
Sparrow AIM-7F 92 
Phoenix AIM-54A 122 
Sparrow AIM-7M 96 
AMRAAM AIM-1 20A 97 
Sidewinder AIM-9X 73 
* Note: All numbers of total test assets were listed in reference 14 
except AIM-9X, which was recorded in reference 15 .  
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F/A-18 Radar Testing History 
Most early air-to-air RF missiles were designed to optimize performance specifications in 
terms of range and maneuverability. At first, there were no significant EA threats, so EP 
was not a priority. Initial design requirements ( or specifications) for RF missile and 
aircraft radars did not even include EP performance. As EA threats evolved, RF missiles 
such as the AMRAAM were developed to include EP as a counter to EA. However, 
aircraft radars priorities were initially focused on several other large functions such as 
air-to-ground mapping. EP has not yet evolved nearly as much in aircraft radar. For 
example, the baseline F/A-18 radar, APG-65, had no formal requirements for EP 
capability16• Some EP capability has since been designed into the radar, but nearly all 
testing conducted to date has been of the "blue sky" type, meaning a clean environment. 
No formal weapon system integration (aircraft and missile) has been realized for the F/A-
18 against electronic threats. Today the APG-65 (baseline radar for the F/A-18) and the 
APG-73 (upgraded radar for the F/A-18) in the F/A-18 aircraft receive little funding for 
improvements such as expanded EP capability. The newest aircraft radar, which receives 
nearly all F/A-18 radar funding, is the APG-79 Active Electronically Scanning Array 
(AESA) radar. The APG-79 was designed for the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet. However, 
the EP specifications of the APG-79 are limited and APG-79 development does not 
include integrated weapons systems optimization through co-development with weapons 
such as the AMRAAM 17 • 
Development of missiles systems in the USN is a function of several independent design 
efforts. Program managers in Naval Air Systems Command (NA VAIR) are funded for 
development of specific systems such as aircraft, air-to-air missiles, mission planning, 
etc. Development of the F/A-18 and its radar systems, the APG-65 and APG-73, has 
been independent of the development of the AMRAAM and other missiles in terms of 
EP. Although integrated weapon system development, which proved effective for the 
AWG-9 (F-14 radar) and AIM-54C Phoenix (active radar guidance missile carried by the 
F-14), would have offered much more capable AMRAAM weapon systems, short-term 
funding limitations precluded integrated development of the F/ A-18 radar and the 
AMRAAM 1 8 • After having seen only a few air threats employing EA in combat in the 
last three decades, EP funding was probably not at the top of the USN requirements for 
the F/A-18 radar. Since Operation Desert Storm, precision-guided weapons integration, 
such as Global Positioning System (GPS) guided bombs, have received more attention 
and funding. 
AMRAAM Testing History 
"Typically, AMRAAM testing against various electronic attack waveforms has been 
missile-only using assumed aircraft support values . . .  This has always been a shortcoming 
of the test program, since it is well known that aircraft performance against EA greatly 
affects missile performance, at least early in flight 16 ." The AMRAAM was integrated 
into the F/A-18 by developing the F/A-18 radar and mission computer software to 
support the missile functions. However, the design of the missile and the radar were not 
further developed to optimize weapon system performance against threats such as EA. 
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Weapons System Testing History 
The USAF is the lead service of the joint AMRAAM program, which also includes the 
USN. Although the USAF has no dedicated testing effort for weapons systems against 
EA, they do perform aircrew weapons training at Tyndall Air Force Base involving the 
launching of live missiles against various threat systems, often including EA. Although 
the data gathered is considered very accurate, there are relatively few data points (85-100 
event per year) and there is no verification and validation of launch results using 
simulation 13 • 
AMRAAM EP system characterization is important enough to be one function of the 
Navy AMRAAM Test Team, though funding is limited. AMRAAM EP testing is a 
subset of the F/A-18 and AMRAAM Weapon System Evaluation (WSE), a program 
designed to document the performance of the F/A-18 and AMRAAM when used together 
as a weapons system against tactically representative threats. No dedicated effort to 
evaluate the total weapon system was made until the WSE was started in 1996. 
Test Goal: Probability of Guidance and Probability of Weapon Effectiveness 
Performance is measured by the metric shown in table 2 designed to classify Probability 
of Guidance (PG) into generalized performance categories. This metric dates from early 
AMRAAM development when AMRAAM performance was measured against the 
performance of the AIM-7 and AIM-154 16 . Although the criteria are rather arbitrary, the 
traditional metric provides a consistent reference frame, and is familiar to program 
managers. 
One of the final products of the EP testing completed under the WSE program is a color 
table, or ' color chart' as it is called, representing PG against specific EA threats. The 
table includes the AMRAAM performance supported by both the Fl A-18' s APG-65 and 
APG-73 radars versus all threats tested. Two modes of the radar are tested versus each 
threat: Single Target Track (STT) and Track While Scan (TWS). The table also 
represents performance against the EA threats using perfect radar cueing of the 
AMRAAM to show the effects of the EA on the missile alone. For illustration, an 
example of the table format is shown in table 3. 
Each year, the Navy AMRAAM Test Team and representatives from Top Gun and other 
activities meet to generate a list of the top 10 threats for testing. Generally, each 
Table 2: Electronic Testing Performance Metric 
Criteria 
Pa > 85% 
50% < Pa <  85% 
20% < Pa <  50% 
Pa < 20% 
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successive version of missile software has enhanced capability to counter EA. However, 
not all missile software versions are tested against all EA threats due to priorities and 
funding constraints. Sometimes priorities include testing of the missile software most 
widely used in the Fleet, as opposed to the newest, most capable version of software. So 
the composite table represents an aggregate performance of several software versions 
without specifying the software version of the missile for each individual table cell .  The 
"stoplight" format is a historically useful reference il lustrating qualitative system 
performance to decision makers. Top Gun has requested it because of its simplicity. 
However, individuals who use the table to make programmatic or tactical decisions often 
do not realize the several versions of software represented. Additionally, users of the 
table also do not, in general, realize the uncertainties associated with each calculation of 
Pa. Uncertainty, which is unique for each Pa calculation, is not included in the table. 
Users of the table recognize that NA VAIR is responsible for providing the highest quality 
of information possible, and do not consider the uncertainty of each performance 
calculation in their decision-making processes. 
Another major drawback of the table is the excessive range of Pa represented by a single 
color . . Performance of the AMRAAM supported by APG-73 STT against EA 4 might be 
represented by a green cell , indicating what could be considered "fair" performance. Pa 
could be any percentage within the range of 50% to 85%. For small numbers of data 
runs, which is common in missile testing, the uncertainty is also large. An uncertainty of 
only 25% associated with a calculated Pa of 65% covers three color cells of performance 
from blue to yel low, representing a range or performance anywhere from "poor" to 
"good." The large range of color cells combined with no representation of uncertainty 
make the table a somewhat ambiguous indication of weapon system performance against 
EA. 
To better illustrate weapon system performance against EA, another final product was 
created to show differences between missile performance using actual aircraft radar data 
and missile performance using perfect aircraft radar data. Performance is represented in 
terms of probabil ity of weapon effectiveness (PWE), which combines Pa and the results of 
lethality simulations to calculate the percentage of time the AMRAAM would 
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Figure 3:  Format of Final Product Illustrating Probability of Weapon Effectiveness 
this format specifies the version of AMRAAM software for each test and presents 
performance in much more specific terms, there is still no indication of the uncertainty 
associated with the probability calculation. 
The table and bar chart are updated yearly. The primary customers of these two final 
products are Top Gun, the squadron in the USN responsible for generating and teaching 
Fleet tactics, and program managers, who are responsible for deciding how funding will 
be spent to improve performance through further development. The products are also 
made available other squadrons responsible for tactics training. 
Test Assets 
AMRAAM Captive Equipment (ACE) 
One of the main components of the EP test program is the ACE pod, shown in figure 4. 
The ACE pod is an AMRAAM missile encapsulated by unique test equipment designed 
to keep the missile cool during RF seeker and guidance unit operation. The pod also 
includes equipment that allows for real-time performance data transmission and data 
recording. 
Integration Test Vehicle (ITV) 
The ITV pod is a captive-carry AMRAAM missile, comprised of a functional guidance 
unit and disabled transmitter inside a missile body without fins, as shown in figure 5. 
The ITV is a simpler vehicle than the ACE. There is no recording equipment, and no 
need for a cooling system. However, the ITV does have a data link receiver. Similar to 
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Figure 4: ACE pod used for captive AMRAAM testing 
ITV on outboard station of dual m issile launcher 
Figure 5: ITV pod used for captive AMRAAM testing 
1 1  
the ACE, the ITV receives pre-launch cueing and post-launch data links from the F/A-18 
radar during simulated fly-out and relays this information to ground facilities via 
telemetry. 
Hard-Ware In the Loop (HWIL) Simulation 
The HWIL facility is used for real-cueing and perfect-cueing simulation series. The 
HWIL is an anechoic chamber housing an AMRAAM seeker/servo assembly mounted on 
a 3-axis flight table and a 60-horn RF array that generates the appropriate radio­
frequency signals including target return, EA, and clutter. A special Aircraft Waveform 
Generator (A WG) is used to provide the APG-65 and APG-73 fire control radar signals 
during simulation runs. A central digital processor programmed with a 6-Degrees-Of­
Freedom (DOF) aerodynamic model and various environment models controls these 
HWIL components. Pictures of the HWIL components are shown in figure 6. 
Digital Simulation 
The first all-digital simulator used for EP testing was the Complex Seeker Simulator 
(CSS), which was a 6-DOF, UNIX-based, digital simulation of early versions of the 
AMRAAM. CSS was owned and operated by the US government until funding for 
digital simulation was transferred to the prime contractor in 1997. 
Simulation Computers Shielded Room Antenna Array 
, , , 
Missile Interface 
Missile on Flight Table 
Real Time Data Presentation Anechoic Chamber 
Figure 6: AMRAAM HWIL Facility 
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Current simulators include the AMRAAM Raytheon Simulation (ARS) and Raytheon' s  
Team Simulator (TEAM SIM). ARS is a simple 3-DOF simulator that does not include 
robust EA models. TEAM SIM is a 6-DOF, FORTRAN-based simulator that can more 
accurately model EA against specific versions of the AMRAAM. TEAM SIM very 
accurately models AMRAAM software, including the actual execution of AMRAAM 
code during simulation, but is limited in modeling the complex hardware characteristics 
of the missile (and of the aircraft). 
Weapons System Evaluation (WSE) Funding 
WSE is structured for completion of five to six EP flight test events and associated 
HWIL, lethality analysis, and reporting requirements is a single fiscal year. Costs are 
typically $ 1 .5 to $2.0 million in today' s dollars. Figure 7 shows a breakdown of the costs 
associated with EP testing, using the following definitions. 
• Flight Test Engineering Support - flight test engineer and test pilot labor. 
• Flight Test - F/A- 18, target aircraft, and range costs. 
• Analysis and Reporting - analyst labor, computer lab and report generation costs . 
Flexibility in allocation of funding is l imited because the test team that performs the EP 
testing is also responsible for several other AMRAAM test functions. Some variables, 
such as number of analysts, cannot change. Other variables, such as use of the 
AMRAAM HWIL, can be modified to some extent, but costs will not scale linearly and 
may change because of other test programs. 
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Figure 7: EP Test Budget for FY 200318 
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2. ELECTRONIC PROTECTION TEST METHODS 
AMRAAM WSE is a program that is difficult to understand because of the complex 
nature of the test environment and the broader programmatic issues associated with 
AMRAAM flight testing. Although at first it may appear that EP testing is a candidate 
for improvement through advanced simulation methods or more efficient use of existing 
test assets, optimization requires a more thorough analysis. The two end products (table 
and bar graphs) do not seem to capture the technical acuity present in other AMRAAM 
flight testing results. The table is not well liked by AMRAAM engineers and analysts 
because it does not represent the technical resolution standard in most engineering 
documentation8• 1 3 . The table and chart, however, serve the customer well. Producing 
more accurate representation of AMRAAM EP performance (reducing uncertainty 
associated with performance calculations) would improve the program more than 
changing the format of the test results. 
On paper, the number of captive test flights and number of AMRAAM HWIL 
simulations for each captive run appears to be more of a result of funding and test asset 
availability than a statistically optimized process. Initially, using the HWIL for EP 
testing dovetailed with the organizational desire to keep the HWIL as a viable test asset 
and programmatic interest in weapon system evaluation 1 6. Although there is some 
documentation detailing the structure of EP testing, there is no documentation showing 
that the current asset utilization provides optimum evaluation of the Fl A-18 and 
AMRAAM weapon system. 
Table 4 shows the options available for missile testing using available test assets. A live 
missile shot against a full-scale target would give the most accurate indication of weapon 
system performance. However, the cost of a missile and unit cost of a full-scale target (if 
the missile guides properly and destroys the target) for one data point is excessive. 
Replacing the warhead with a telemetry system would increase the data that could be 
gathered on one shot, but does not decrease the very high cost of live-fire missile testing. 
In fact, the added instrumentation would likely increase the cost. 
At the other end of the scale, running all-digital computer simulations is relatively 
inexpensive. However, these simulations cannot accurately model EA, resulting in low­
fidelity data that does not accurately represent weapon system performance. 
Generating new test assets, such as a digital computer simulation with higher fidelity in 
simulating EA could also be considered. Computers have been used effectively to 
simulate missile kinematics. However, the cost of accurately modeling the highly 
dynamic electromagnetic environment when an AMRAAM is shot at an airborne target 
transmitting EA may be prohibitively high, if not impossible8 • As an example, the 
contract to Dynetics for development of the CSS cost more than $360 million in the early 
1990's 1 8 . The contract supported other functions but nearly all funding was for CSS. 
Some aspects of the target environment such as main lobe clutter and altitude return were 
excellent in CSS, but the simulator lacked credible EA models 1 3 • 
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Table 4: Cost versus Quality for AMRAAM EP Testing 
Test Type Data Characteristics Cost 
Warhead missile versus full scale target • highest quality very high • one data point only 
Telemetry missile versus full scale target • high quality • continuous data collection very high 
Telemetry captive missile versus sub- • medium quality 
scale target with EW pod • continuous data collection high • limited test application 
Telemetry captive missile versus full- • medium quality high scale tar,e;et with EW pod • continuous data collection 
• medium to low quality 
HWIL simulation of missile profile • invalid without validation medium 
from actual flight test 
Computer simulation of missile profile • low quality low • only valid for kinematics 
For scenarios difficult to model, as is usually the case with EA, digital simulations 
generally require validation through actual flight test. EA techniques are uniquely 
different, requiring flight test validation for every technique, thereby negating much if not 
all of the cost savings associated with digital simulation. 
The unpredictable nature of RF warfare places a high premium on the value of 
generalized performance parameters. Repeated airborne testing associated with the 
captive missile option (ACE and ITV) allows for quick and accurate collection of large 
amounts of data that can be used to calculate generalized performance of the weapon 
system. Although captive missile testing does not include performance of the missile as 
it approaches the target at high speeds, the AMRAAM HWIL can be used as an efficient 
means of providing "end game" data. The use of a captive missile against a full-scale 
target capable of generating the specific EA combined with HWIL simulations of missile 
fly-out using recorded aircraft radar data links has proven to be the best tradeoff between 
cost and data quality. Sub-scale targets such as the BQM-34 and BQM-74 also offer a 
viable solution, and have proven capable of providing some EA capability. However, 
sub-scale targets have lower RF fidelity and higher presentation costs than manned full­
scale targets. 
EVALUATION OF TEST METHODOLOGY 
Since 1996, the EP portion of WSE testing has evolved to a consistent process. First, a 
yearly list of the top threats is generated. Based on a prioritized ranking of EA 
techniques, asset availability, and cost of testing, captive flight tests are scheduled 
throughout the year. Typically, seven flights are planned and five actually generate data. 
Reasons for failure to complete missions include range conflicts, aircraft maintenance 
problems, weather, instrumentation problems, telemetry problems, and test equipment 
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technical problems. Each flight involves two F/A-18s with captive AMRAAMs each, 
one ACE and one ITV. One F/A-18 is configured with APG-65 radar and the other with 
APG-73 radar. Two aircraft are used to simulate a tactical section employing AMRAAM 
against one or more full-scale targets configured with EA generating equipment. An 
average of 10 flight passes (with one simulated missile shot by each aircraft per run) are 
completed for each flight. Each aircraft executes half of the passes using STT radar 
mode and half using TWS radar mode. 
Umbilical cueing (initial transmission of data to missile on the rail just before firing) and 
data link files (transmission of data from aircraft to missile in flight) for each run are 
recorded, representing F/A-18 radar performance in the threat environment. These files 
are then loaded into the AMRAAM HWIL to be used during the AMRAAM fly-out 
simulation in a modeling of the same environment (there is no accurate simulation of 
missile fly-out in the captive missile flight tests). For each data link file from the F/A-18, 
20 HWIL runs (fly-out simulations) are executed. Each run records unique AMRAAM 
end-to-end performance. No two runs are alike primarily because of the stochastic nature 
of the radar and jamming through natural effects that cannot be controlled. Some 
jammers are free running - they can only be turned on; the phase of their jam cycles 
cannot be timed during the runs8• Additionally, a 16-parameter noise model is sometimes 
used to simulate the expected variance of both rocket motor thrust and physical missile 
loading alignment on the F/A-188• Po is calculated from the fly-out simulation results. 
Each HWIL fly-out simulation is then recorded and input into a digital computer lethality 
simulation that accurately models the missile kinematics relative to a model of actual 
threat aircraft using an endgame methodology called SCAN 1 9  (developed at USN Pacific 
Missile Test Center, now NA VAIR Weapons Division - Point Mugu). Fifty lethality 
simulations are run on an Alpha workstation for each HWIL run. Using the results of the 
lethality simulation and various performance metrics, PWE is computed for the 
AMRAAM when supported by both STT and TWS track modes of both radars. A 
diagram of the test flow is illustrated in figure 8. 
The basis of this AMRAAM performance calculation includes how well the aircraft 
directs the missile to the target area. The AMRAAM in many cases may be able to 
correct for inaccurate radar information. However, if the radar does not provide 
information with a certain degree of accuracy, the missile will never find the target. 
Weighing the importance of the radar and missile performance in the weapon system is 
difficult because of the complicated nature of the environment. Missile performance 
would likely be considered inore important, but radar performance must meet at least a 
certain level of accuracy. Evaluation of the weapon system involves answering a simple 
question: will the missile kill the target? Generally, radar performance can be divided 
into the three categories delineated in table 5. 
Although radar performance can be categorized neatly, measuring weapon system 
performance is not as simple. Due to the stochastic nature of EA effectiveness, often 
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Table 5: Radar Performance Categories 
Radar Performance Category Description 
INEFFECTIVE Missile never sees target 
MODERATELY EFFECTNE 
Missile sees target and is sometimes 
able to correct for error in radar data 
EFFECTNE 
Missile sees target and is able to guide 
to the target 
successive runs with the same radar against the same threat will results in radar 
performance in each of the three categories shown in table 5. 
Accurately modeling radar performance in the HWIL is essential to accurately measuring 
total weapon system effectiveness. Figure 8 shows that although several simulations are 
used to quantify missile performance, the foundation for measurement of weapon system 
effectiveness is radar performance, recorded on only a few captive flight tests. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EP TESTING PROCESS 
In attempt to quantify the uncertainty associated with current EP performance 
calculations, a statistical analysis was completed. Using a simple model, PWE is related to 
the probability of radar effectiveness (PR) and probability of missile effectiveness (PM) by 
the multiplication rule for dependent events20 : 
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Considering PR the true population percentage of the time the radar effectively supports 
the missile, we can calculate the confidence interval in estimating PR for a given sample 




0i is the standard deviation of the population, u is the uncertainty, Z is the number of 
standard deviations, and 7t is the assumed value of population percentage. Since there is 
no way to estimate population percentage, a value of 50% is used for 7t because it 
represents the largest sample size that could be required. Solving for the uncertainty (u) 
using Z values associated with different confidence intervals results in the numbers show 
in table 6. 
Therefore, calculation of PWE can at best be within± 43.6% of the true performance of 
the weapon system, assuming perfect missile performance and using a confidence 
interval of 95%, which is a common system evaluation parameter in the USN. 
Following the same procedure results in the uncertainty for PM shown in table 7. The 
larger sample for missile performance vastly decreases the uncertainty associated with 
calculating missile effectiveness (PM), 
Combining the uncertainties using the multiplication rule results in an uncertainty of 
± 44.4% in the calculation of PWE (using 95% confidence interval). If PWE were 
calculated to be 50%, this large uncertainty of± 44.4% would span all four colors 
representing performance shown in table 2. Such large uncertainty does not serve as a 
solid foundation for generation of fighter tactics for combating EA. 
The small data sample of radar performance is the limiting factor in calculating Pa and 
PWE. More samples are needed for reasonable levels of uncertainty. The obvious way to 
Table 6: Uncertainty of PR Based on Five Flight Test Runs 
Confidence Number of Standard Uncertainty (u) Interval Deviations (Z) 
90% 1.645 ± 36.6% 
95% 1.960 ± 43.6% 
99% 2.575 ± 57.2% 
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Table 7: Uncertainty of PM Based on 5,000 Missile Simulations 
Confidence Number of Standard 
Uncertainty (u) 
Interval Deviations (Z) 
90% 1 .645 ± 1 . 1 6% 
95% 1 .960 ± 1 .39% 
99% 2.575 ± 1 .82% 
generate more radar data would be to increase the numbers of runs (number of flights) 
against each EA technique. As shown in figure 7, costs associated with flight test already 
account for 46% of the WSE budget for EP testing. Funding for the program can not be 
increased to accommodate more flights and the associated increase in HWIL simulations 
and analysis. Doubling the number of missions against each EA technique would double 
the sample size. However, instead of being able to evaluate five EA techniques each 
year, the additional data collection would only allow evaluation of two or three EA 
techniques. After seven years of consistent reporting of weapon system performance, 
halving the number of techniques evaluated without cutting program costs would 
jeopardize the program as a whole because in a time of shrinking budgets, many would 
argue that the results do not warrant program costs. Other ways must be found to 
increase radar samples. 
INVESTIGATION OF RADAR DATA LINKS AS STOCHASTIC SIGNALS 
To get a better idea of the characteristics of the radar data sent to the missile, and to 
investigate the possibility of recreating radar data, characteristic parameters of the radar 
data links were plotted and evaluated using MATLAB 6.5 and Microsoft Excel 2000 
software tools. 
The primary function of the radar data links is to provide angle, position and velocity 
information of the target to the missile. Errors in measurement and transmission of 
position and velocity represent the stochastic nature of radar performance and the 
effectiveness of EA. Calculation of errors present during a flight test is possible through 
comparison of missile data to the actual target position and velocity, recorded through 
electronic tracking of Time Space Position Information (TSPI) on the test ranges. 
Average TSPI deviation has been calculated in an independent study to be 1 7  meters for a 
high-speed missile (> Mach 2)8 • For EP testing, TSPI is considered to be truth data. 
Four flight tests were selected for further investigation. To approximate a distributed 
collection of radar performance, flight tests were chosen based on test pilot impression of 
radar performance against EA as indicated by radar display indications in the cockpit. 
The four tests represent what was considered to be the best performance, worst 
performance, and two average performances out of eight consecutive EP flight tests, each 
testing performance against a different type of EA. Two tests represent APG-65 
performance and two represent APG-73 performance. Each flight test included 
approximately half the runs using STT and half using TWS. 
19 
Probability Density Function 
All stochastic processes are "an ensemble of time signals" that have values represented 
by random variables21 . The random variable is best described by its probability density 
function, referred to as "pdf." If the pdf of a random signal does not change with time, 
the process represented by the random variable is considered stationary. If, for a 
stationary process, "the time averages . . .  converge to ensemble averages," the process is 
considered ergotic21 • Therefore, if the radar data link errors can be assumed to be 
stationary and ergotic, then the pdf of the process can be estimated from one or more 
recorded signals. Synthetic generation of signals with the same pdf (sampling from the 
ensemble of time signals) would, in that case, be possible. 
Determination of Stationarity 
In stationary processes, the mean and variance of the signals are constants. To determine 
stationarity, the data link errors were first plotted as functions of time. Figures 9 and 10 
show range and range rate data link errors from one of the test flights plotted as a 
function of time. 
Figure 10 uses two vertical axes to better illustrate the data trends because the 
significantly larger values associated with runs 1 and 5 compressed the other data series 
into a nearly straight line. Inspection of the time-based plot of STT range and range rate 
shows that each test runs appears to have resulted in unique sets of data, with no 
generalized or repeated trend. The same is true for the TWS test runs in flight 1, as well 
as all of the test runs in the other three flights. Appendix A includes similar figures for 
each test run of the four flights. 
Further investigation required calculation of time-based mean and deviation to determine 
whether or not these signal characteristics vary with time or remain relatively constant 
within some repetitive deviation. Since each test run started from approximately the 
same separation between the shooter and target, all sets of data link errors were analyzed 
by referencing the umbilical data as the start of each run. Figures 1 1  and 1 2  show the 
mean and standard deviation for STT test runs on each of the four flights. Clearly the 
signals appear to vary with time in all cases. Both mean and standard deviation appear to 
follow random patterns for all four flights. There is no apparent governing equation that 
could explain these signal characteristics. Similar characteristics are found for mean and 
standard deviation for TWS range errors, STT range rate errors, and TWS range rate 
errors, all plotted in Appendix B. 
Determination of Ergodicity 
Signals can not be considered ergotic without first being stationary. Figures 11 and 12 do 
not suggest stationarity. Further evidence that the signals cannot be considered ergotic is 
found in the characteristics of the ensemble averages. As shown in table 8, there is 
considerable variance between averages for each run. Ergotic signals would converge to 
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Table 8: Ensemble Averages for STT Range Errors 
Run Flight 1 Flight 2 Flight 3 Flight 4 
1 s
t 
0.2 12  0.023 -0.004 0.08 1 
2nd 0.062 0.007 0.978 0. 1 1 8 
3r
d 
0. 124 0.007 -0.0 12  -0.003 
4th 0.238 0.002 -0.0 1 1 -0.009 
5th 0.04 1 -0.006 -0.005 -0.049 
6t
h 
0. 19 1  - 1 .000 -0.303 0.001 
7th NIA -0.22 1 NIA -0.063 
Standard Deviation 0.082 0.376 · 0.443 0.066 
the same average. Approximation may be possible with standard deviations within 1 % or 
2%. However, the smallest standard deviation for STT range errors was over 6%. 
Similar tables for STT range rate, TWS range, and TWS range rate are shown in 
Appendix C. No standard deviation for any mode was less than 5%. Therefore, the 
signals are not ergotic and must be considered unique. 
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3. TEST METHOD OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUES 
An increase in the number of radar data files is needed to better characterize radar 
performance against specific EA to decrease the uncertainty associated with the weapon 
system evaluation. Budget constraints do not allow more test flights - certainly not as 
many as would be necessary to significantly decrease the uncertainty associated with the 
current testing process. The following three techniques for generation of radar data files 
were investigated for their viability in the test process. 
• Synthetic data link file generation 
• Time shift expansion of data link files 
• Employment of radar laboratory to generate additional radar performance data 
Each technique was evaluated for accuracy in representing radar performance while 
staying within budget requirements. 
SYNTHETIC DATA LINK FILE GENERATION 
The simplest way to generate radar data files would be to generate the files based on 
characteristics of the flight test radar data files. Costs associated with implementing this 
technique would be low. However, using generated data files would not increase the 
accuracy of the test process. Based on the statistical evaluation of test radar data above, 
the radar data files are neither stationary nor ergotic. There is no known governing 
equation or function that can be used for signal generation. Therefore, inclusion of 
synthetically generating signals in the EP testing process would increase, rather than 
decrease, uncertainty in the testing results. 
TIME SHIFT EXPANSION OF RADAR TRACK FILES 
Since synthetically generated data does not appear to be useful, generating more data files 
from each test flight (using actual test data) was investigated. During an intercept, the 
Fl A-18 radar continually maintains a track file of the target. After missile launch, data 
link messages are transmitted to the missile at discrete time intervals using current track 
file information. Test instrumentation in the F/A-18s records mux bus traffic during the 
flight, which includes radar track file information sampled at a high data rate. Time shift 
expansion involves projecting what data links would have been at different time intervals 
of the missile fly-out. Figure 13 illustrates time shift expansion by projecting data links 
at half of the period of actual data links. 
Although recorded for each test flight in case specific radar or aircraft discrepancies are 
noted, mux bus data is not typically included in EP evaluation. Only one of the four 
flights investigated (flight 4) had associated mux bus data still available. Flight 4 may 
not have been the best example for time shift expansion, but data from all other flights 
had not been saved. Extracting this data and comparing it to TSPI, considered truth data, 
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Actual data l i nks (recorded in flight test) 
31 I 
Projected data l inks 
Figure 13: Illustration of Time Shift Expansion Method 
allowed for determination of track file errors between data links, effectively drawing the 
l ine between data points on graphs showing data link errors (such as figures 9 and 1 0) .  
Run 12  of flight 4 was selected because STT range errors (shown in figure 1 4) suggest 
l imited usefulness of time shift expansion and, at the same time, STT range rate errors 
( shown in figure 1 5) suggest some potential for the method. 
Both figures illustrate the relationship between track file, data link, and projected data 
link errors, which were created by plotting the data link value according to the radar track 
file at times corresponding to the addition of half of the average data link period to each 
data link time. Gaps between data l inks represent data links that were not recorded by the 
missile due to any of a number of reasons associated with the dynamics of the threat 
environment. For purposes of generating a realistic time shifted set of data links, gaps 
were included in the projected data. 
Inspection of the projected data links in figure 14  reveals a profile not significantly 
different that the actual set of data links. The profile of projected data links in figure 1 5  
differs more than the actual data l inks but may not differ enough to significantly change 
the AMRAAM P0. Appendix D includes charts similar to figures 1 4  and 1 5  for each of 
the runs in flight 4 in which data was recovered. Data l inks in TWS runs do not appear to 
correlate to the track files as closely as STT. Such differences can probably be explained 
by extrapolation and processing delays associated with the time-share concept of TWS. 
Projected data links for TWS runs involved averaging actual data links across each data 
link period and extrapolating data link trends when actual data links did not bound the 
projected data l ink time. 
Incorporating mux bus data into the EP testing process would be relatively inexpensive. 
From track file data in the mux bus, more than one set of radar data links could be 
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during Run 12 
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1 1 0 
1 1 0 
extracted (which may be practical if track files vary significantly between data links). 
Generally, if radar performance is effective or ineffective, as defined in table 5 ,  
expanding track files into more than the recorded set of data links would probably not 
have much of an effect. However, for moderately effective radar performance, track file 
expansion into more than one file may have a significant effect, especially if there are 
significant differences between two_ or more sets of data from the same track file. 
AMRAAM performance is most sensitive to the last data link it incorporates into its 
guidance solution22 • Usually the last data link used by the missile is one of the last data 
links sent to the missile, but not necessarily the last data link. At a specific range based 
on several parameters, the AMRAAM stops incorporating data links received into its 
guidance solution. The aircraft can estimate, but does not know when the AMRAAM 
will stop using data link information in its guidance solution. Variation in data link errors 
during later data links in particular could potentially impact AMRAAM performance. 
Further investigation would be required to quantify the usefulness of this method in terms 
of increasing EP testing accuracy (decreasing uncertainty) . Gathering data against more 
than one EA threat would provide better evaluation of the time shift expansion method. 
Comparing the performance of AMRAAM simulations using actual data link sets to the 
same performance using time shift expanded data l ink sets would give a clear indication 
of the usefulness of this method. However, in any case, the data from flight 4 shows that 
time shift expansion of data links can produce data link sets that do not vary much from 
actual data links sets . 
Although time shift expansion would be inexpensive - and would probably add to the 
current process - there are obvious limitations . Given the small differences between data 
l inks error profiles in the same flight against one EA, it appears that more unique data 
link files are needed to more fully and accurately characterize radar performance. 
Expanding recorded sets of data from a given few passes offers a better characterization 
of radar performance for the recorded runs, but because radar performance usually varies 
widely from run to run, this method would at best only slightly increase the accuracy in 
characterizing overall radar performance. Although difficult to quantify statistically, time 
expansion would most likely improve the test process slightly, but would not satisfy the 
basic need for more independent sets of radar data. 
EMPLOYMENT OF RADAR LABORATORY 
Radar Ltlboratory Description 
At NAVAIR's  Advanced Weapons Laboratory, located at Naval Air Weapons Station 
China Lake, there is an F/A- 18 radar laboratory used "to develop, modify, and provide 
test support for the APG-73 Radar OFP [Operation Flight Program], test and repair the 
radar hardware, and monitor performance evaluation of the radar system23 ." The 
laboratory is also "capable of recording radar instrumentation data and performing data 
reduction and analysis for radar performance23 ." Figure 1 6  illustrates the integration of 
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the radar laboratory are the antenna rack and an antenna feed horn. The antenna rack is 
used to mount an actual radar assembly (either APG-65 or APG-73). Power and cooling 
allow continuous radar operation. The feed horn is located directly in front of the radar 
assembly, mounted on a catwalk attached to the outside wall of the radar laboratory 
space. This configuration allows for testing against real world targets located outside of 
the laboratory. The laboratory is also comprised of the operator console and spread 
bench (both shown in figure 17), an equipment rack, and an equipment bay. The 
equipment bay contains radar software and software used for target generation. Multiple 
targets can be generated in three-dimensions using the wave-guide assembly on the radar. 
Targets utilizing EA can be simulated using the feed horn. For current operations, the 
target generator is used almost exclusively for radar software validation (no performance 
testing). 
EP Testing in Radar La,boratory 
Performance testing of radar EP in the radar laboratory has been limited for two reasons. 
First, the feed horn is physically fixed directly in front of the radar rack. Therefore, 
maneuvering of EA targets can only be simulated in range. Second, there is no 
calculation or recording of target truth data by which to compare radar performance. The 
only way to approximate truth data is to estimate target position using radar performance 
against the target without EA as a baseline. For example, a test run against an EA target 
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spread bench 
Figure 17: Radar Laboratory Components 
could be set up such that the run starts and ends without EA. Position during the middle 
of the run (with EA) could be interpolated based on calculated positions at the beginning 
and end of the run. However, this process was considered too inaccurate for EP flight 
testing. Therefore, AMRAAM EP testing did not include the radar laboratory in the EP 
test process. 
The radar target generator software is scheduled to be upgraded in the fall of 2003 to 
include recording capabil ity for target position (truth data) in addition to radar 
determination of target position24• The improved capability will make the laboratory data 
much more valuable to the EP testing process. Although the radar laboratory testing will 
be limited to a target in range only, the effects of maneuvering in three dimensions during 
an intercept of an EA target are insignificant compared to the improvements in modeling 
radar performance versus each EA technique. 
Radar Laboratory Costs 
Unlike the two previously discussed techniques for generating more radar performance 
data files, use of the radar laboratory would be somewhat expensive and difficult to 
schedule. Other AWL programs often receive higher priority for laboratory use. EP 
testing, however, is completed on a yearly cycle. Potential delays of the aircraft radar 
simulations would need to be factored into the EP test schedule, but would not pose an 
insurmountable challenge. Funding for radar laboratory testing would also require 
adjustment of the current testing process, but would be possible within the WSE budget 
for EP testing. Using the radar laboratory on off-peak days would cost an estimated 
$6,000 per day24• Most of the day would be needed to set up the laboratory to accurately 
simulate the target and EA by matching the target generator output to that recorded 
during actual flight testing. Runs are simulated real-time in the radar laboratory. A 
typical engagement takes only a few minutes. After the radar laboratory has been 
initialized, one hour of test runs would produce approximately 40 radar performance data 
files. One day per EA technique would easily allow 200 simulations. 
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More radar performance data files would mean less uncertainty in the EP testing process, 
but increasing the number of radar laboratory runs would also increase the costs 
associated with set-up and operation of the HWIL. Although fewer HWIL runs would be 
required for each radar data set to maintain the same total number of AMRAAM 
simulations, the cost of setting up the HWIL for each radar data set accounts for a 
significant portion of the HWIL operational cost1 8 • Table 9 illustrates that if the number 
of radar sets were doubled, the increase in HWIL operational costs would be 40%. 
Determination of Optimal Number of Radar Data Sets 
Increasing the number of radar data sets used for HWIL tests will cost more money. If 
WSE funding remains relatively steady, as is expected 1 8, some other part of the budget 
will have to be reduced. The only logical reduction would be number of test flights. If 
the number of test flights per year were reduced by one, enough money would be 
available for inclusion of many more radar data sets into the HWIL. Many factors 
outside the scope of this study are involved in budget determination each year. For 
analysis purposes only, an approximation of budget components was made to illustrate 
the increase in overall decrease in uncertainty that would be gained by increasing the 
radar data. Table 10 shows a theoretical budget shift, assuming more radar data would 
only slightly increase analysis required. 
Using the budget structure in figure 7, the increase in money for HWIL operations would 
allow approximately 80 more radar data files for each test flight. The radar laboratory 
would need to be used to generate 40 simulations (20 STT and 20 TWS) of APG-65 and 
of APG-73 for each EA technique. These 80 runs would be added to the 10 flight test 
runs of each radar type against the EA target for a total of 100 radar data sets to be tested 
in the HWIL. Using the 95% confidence interval, the uncertainties associated with 
performance calculations for each radar mode would be decreased from± 44.4% to± 
20.5% as shown in table 11. 
Table 9: Cost of HWIL Operations as Data Sets Increase 
HWIL Cost Break-down 
Current EP Testing Doubling Radar Data 
(20 radar data sets) (40 radar data sets) 
Set-up $8,000 $16,000 
Test run execution (1000 total) $10,000 $10,000 
HWIL Labor/Maintenance $2,000 $2,000 
Total Cost $20,000 $28,000 
30 
Table 10: Proposed WSE Budget Shift 
Budget Component 2003 WSE Budget Theoretical Budget for 5 EP Test Flights for 4 EP Test Flights 
Flights $382,000 $305,600 
Flight Support $339,000 $267,200 
Radar Laboratory $0 $24,000 
HWIL Operations $ 100,000 $2 14,200 
Analysis $703,000 $7 1 3 ,000 
Lethality Simulations $47,000 $47,000 
Total Cost $1, 571,000 $1, 571,000 
Table 11: Uncertainties in Optimized Test Process 
Probability 
Uncertainty 
Current Test Process Optimized Test Process 
PR ± 43.6% ± 19.6% 
PM ± 1 . 1 6% ± 1 . 1 6% 
PWE ± 44.4% ± 20.5% 
3 1  
CONCLUSIONS 
The AIM-9 Sidewinder and the AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missiles, which entered service 
in 1956 and 195? 13, respectively, are still being carried on US fighters on combat 
missions. Both were recently integrated into the latest mission computer software (high 
order language) of the newest USN fighter, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, indicating 
continued service for years to come. The AMRAAM will almost certainly have a similar 
long service life, spanning many more decades to come. Maintaining and improving 
AMRAAM weapon systems will be essential to countering future threat developments. 
Although using the radar laboratory to add radar data sets to the HWIL simulations is the 
most costly technique to optimize EP testing, it is by far the most effective way to 
improve weapon system evaluation and increase the quality of the final products. Table 
12 lists the qualitative cost and effectiveness of each technique investigated. Synthetic 
data link file generation would make no useful addition to the test process due to the 
unpredictable responses of the radar to EA. Time shift expansion of track files would be 
relatively inexpensive, but has limited potential. Although AMRAAM performance may 
vary based on finite differences in individual data links, expanding track files does not 
have potential to add much to the characterization of radar performance against EA. The 
stochastic and non-stationary characteristics of radar performance require more unique 
data sets to increase the overall process of characterizing weapon system performance. 
Utilizing the radar laboratory to better characterize radar performance is by far the best 
technique for optimizing weapons system testing. Although the number of test flights per 
year would have to be reduced by one to fit within the fixed budget, the dramatic 
reduction in uncertainty would be well worth the sacrifice of one EA technique. 
Calculating PWE against four types of EA within approximately 20% is much more 
valuable than calculating PWE for five types within approximately 45%. An uncertainty 
of± 20% is still large, but it would in most cases cover a span of only two colors of the 
performance metric, as opposed to a minimum of three. If this method were 
incorporated, Top Gun would have a much more solid foundation from which to 
determine tactics appropriate for countering airborne EA threats. 
Table 12: Comparison of Optimization Techniques 
Technique Cost Effectiveness 
Synthetic data link file minimal none generation 
Time shift expansion of minimal low track files 
Radar laboratory significant high 
simulations ( one less test flight) (uncertainty reduced >50%) 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
After the AWL radar laboratory is upgraded, the AMRAAM IPT should pursue 
incorporation of the radar laboratory simulations into the EP testing process. When 
possible, NA VAIR should pursue co-development of coupled systems such as the F/ A-18 
radar and the AMRAAM. Division of test programs routinely causes independent system 
development at the expense of weapon system performance. Integration of system 
development is often constrained by short-term (fiscal) funding. More money is spent 
later in attempt to understand performance of mature systems than would have been 
required to characterize combined performance during co-development. The WSE effort 
has cost NA VAIR approximately $11 million since it began in 19961 8 . Though it may 
not have been feasible at the time, integration of AMRAAM and radar software earlier in 
the developmental stage would not have cost nearly as much. Additionally, performance 
could certainly have been optimized to provide more weapon system capability8· 1 3 • This 
weapon system is now too mature to be optimized for overall system performance. 
Managers of current programs, such as the APG-79 AESA radar, and future programs 
should work towards integrating the development of weapons systems such as aircraft 
radars and air-to-air radar missiles, which will not only save money, but also increase 
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Figure A-1 : Flight 1 TWS Range Errors 
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Figure A-2: Flight 1 TWS Range Rate Errors 
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Figure A-11:  Flight 4 STT Range Errors 
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Figure A-12: Flight 4 TWS Range Errors 
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Figure A-13: Flight 4 STT Range Rate Errors 
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Figure A-14: Flight 4 TWS Range Rate Errors 
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Figure B-4: TWS Range Error Standard Deviation 
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Figure B-5: STT Range Rate Error Standard Deviation 
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Figure B-6: TWS Range Rate Error Standard Deviation 
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Table C-1 : Ensemble Averages for STT Range Rate Errors 
I' 
Run Flight 1 Flight 2 Flight 3 Flight 4 
1 st -0. 1 82 -0.01 8  -0. 1 87 0.001 
2nd -0.009 0.017 0.403 0.000 
3rd -0.098 -0.03 1 -0. 1 79 0.001 
4th 0.001 -0.014 0.227 -0.003 
5th 0.01 1 0.000 0.4 1 1 -0.001 
6th -0.048 - 1 .000 -0.398 0.000 
7th NIA -0. 1 33 -0.904 
Standard 0.074 0.370 0.345 0.342 
Deviation 
Table C-2: Ensemble Averages for TWS Range Errors 
Run Flight 1 Flight 2 Flight 3 Flight 4 
1 st 0.017 -0.040 -0. 109 0.002 
2nd 0. 179 0.350 0.012  -0. 152 
3rd 0.07 1 0.035 0.039 0.069 
4th 0.023 0.0 1 1 -0. 103 0.00 1 
5th NIA NIA -0.3 1 8  0.043 
6th NIA NIA -0.285 NIA 
Standard 0.075 0. 177 0. 148 0.086 
Deviation 
Table C-3: Ensemble Averages for TWS Range Rate Errors 
Run Flight 1 Flight 2 Flight 3 Flight 4 
l st 0.034 -0.093 -0.09 1 0.030 
2nd 0. 1 12 0.010 0.004 -0.992 
3rd 0. 163 0.040 -0.073 -0.046 
4th -0.014 0.000 -0. 108 -0.008 
5th NIA NIA -0.562 0. 125 
6th NIA NIA -0.252 NIA 
Standard 0.079 0.058 0.205 0.459 
Deviation 
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Track File, Data Link, and Projected Data Link Errors for Flight 4 
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